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Abstract: In the broader context of regional studies, the South Atlantic comes across as a singular, 
yet still understudied case study for the formation, evolution, and regression of security regional-
ism dynamics. More so when South Atlantic countries have come to engage in increased regionally 
focused interactions through wider defence co-operation ties. However, they have also steadfastly 
eschewed any kind of permanent structures and shared sovereignty over sensitive security issues. 
This article strives to ascertain the limits and prospects of these regional security dynamics in the 
South Atlantic. With the focal points set on both South American and African shores, I pinpoint 
key overtures in this area and question their contribution to advancing an overall regionalisation 
process. Despite shared threat perceptions and an absence of major intra-regional conflicts, I argue 
that South Atlantic security regionalism lacks a stable and permanent structure inasmuch as it lacks 
real autonomy from the dictums of external regional powers, thus leaving the transatlantic space 
still in flux.
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Introduction
The notion of structured South Atlantic relations based upon a single collective endeav-
our or under a common thematic denominator has held a particular appeal over time. 
During the Cold War, the discursive emphasis on a Soviet build-up in Atlantic waters 
coupled with the international fallout of the South African Apartheid regime were con-
stantly brought up as reasons to pursue new initiatives in the security domain, albeit with 
little to no success. But ‘despite being pronounced dead on so many occasions, the idea of 
a South Atlantic pact … simply refused to die’ (Hurrell 1983: 179). In fact, new attempts 
to readdress the issue and infuse it with new élan have emerged in recent years, while con-
tingent on bursts of leadership by the most preeminent regional actors. Despite steadfastly 
eschewing any kind of permanent structures or shared sovereignty over sensitive security 
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issues, South Atlantic countries have embarked on increased interactions in the form of 
transatlantic defence co-operation overtures. 
In this context, the South Atlantic comes across as a singular yet still understudied 
case study for the formation, evolution, and regression of regional dynamics based on 
security-driven features. Previous contributions have already made significant inroads on 
the subject, most notably on how Brazil attempts to use its defence co-operation initiatives 
across the Atlantic in order to instil an emerging regional identity (e.g. Abdenur and Sou-
za Neto 2014). For the purposes of this article, however, I cast a wider and more critical net 
when regarding this particular area and topic, and seek to both evaluate and ascertain the 
odds of effective implementation and consolidation of a South Atlantic security region-
alism drive. In a rapidly changing landscape that has seen several South American and 
African juggernauts quickly fall from international and economic grace, the issue incites 
particular interest over the sustainability of these initiatives and their contextualisation in 
wider transnational dynamics.
In this kind of analysis, however, multilateral organisations tend to take centre stage, 
as they are often deemed the main regional engines for the overall provision of secu-
rity in such spaces (e.g. Tavares 2010; Aris and Wenger 2014). But this choice can also 
prove problematic, as it leads to an excessive focus on their existence and performance as 
the sole linchpins of a regionalisation process. More so when considering that the South 
Atlantic is characterised by the co-existence of different regional bodies and structures, 
without taking the next step of either additional institutionalisation or shared sovereignty 
(Abdenur 2014). Hence, and in order to understand the dynamics at play, the focus needs 
to be turned to summitry mechanisms and exploratory bilateral inroads that might also 
envision the political construction or, at the very least, the idealisation of a new region-
in-the-making through emerging co-operation relations. Concomitantly, this implies sub-
scribing to a more latu sensu definition of security, one in which transatlantic security 
regionalism can be understood not only as a product of mostly, although not exclusively, 
military-to-military interactions, but also as a potential conductor for a new regional 
space precisely structured around such features. It also implies adopting a more analytical 
approach to the review of these events in order to effectively unpack and expose their dif-
ferent constituting elements.
I begin by exploring the main literature on regionalism in order to demonstrate the 
limitations inherent in existing frameworks of analysis. This allows me to present a se-
ries of benchmarks that escape previous geographic hotspots and can be applicable to the 
South Atlantic case. I then trace the evolution of defence co-operation overtures through-
out the last decade and question their role in either advancing an overall regionalisation 
process or sustaining a largely hollow regional outcome. With the focal points set on both 
South American and African shores, I examine existing bilateral ties and ad hoc mecha-
nisms, while also identifying the underlined strengths and pitfalls of the overall discourse 
behind a new region in the making. The article concludes with some wider implications 
for further research in this area, as well as with some remarks on a transatlantic scenario 
still in flux.
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The evolution of security ‘regionness’
The question of what drives regionalism processes and what actually brings countries 
from one specific region together has remained a central query over the years. The fact 
that it can be perceived from different perspectives further increases the complexity of 
the matter. Whether seen from the viewpoint of the actors that drive such efforts, as an 
incremental process with its own set of variables, or as the outcomes that ultimately ema-
nate from such dynamics, region-building dynamics often prove difficult to grasp in full 
and even more so when aiming for comparative purposes (Van Langenhove 2012: 18–9). 
Given this ambivalence, for the purpose of this article, I opt to regard regionalism as ‘not 
only the institutionalisation of trans-border practices but also [as the] reflection of trans-
formations of the regional space’ (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012: 2). This larger canvas allows 
consideration of varying elements such as shared values, norms, and agendas, as well as 
the creation and development of new institutional mechanisms. 
Further complicating this debate, concepts such as regional integration often intersect 
with regional co-operation (Börzel 2016: 44). The latter, however, is evidently more loose, 
flexible and ambivalent than the former and is not necessarily rooted in a permanent insti-
tutional structure. It can therefore lead more quickly to sporadic regional efforts focused 
on specific issues rather than immediately forming an enduring multilateral organisation 
with wider regional integrative ambitions. But such dynamics remain nonetheless rooted 
in the active predisposition of key regional paymasters, who are also routinely called upon 
to assume the role of ‘easing distributional tensions and thus smoothing the path of inte-
gration’ (Mattli 1999: 56). And although ‘indicators of “regionness” vary according to the 
particular problem or question under investigation’ (Hurrell 1995: 333-4), the security 
domain has managed to attract its share of interest over the years.
The first major contribution to the field emerged with Deutsch’s study (1957) on se-
curity communities. A pluralistic security community was then understood as emerging 
whenever states became integrated to the point that they achieved a sense of commu-
nity, which, in turn, created the assurance that they would settle their differences short 
of war. The topic regained new interest with the constructivist turn in the 1990s, with the 
most significant contribution originating from Adler and Barnett’s proposal (1998) that 
the evolution of a security community should follow an incremental process. This would 
allow such projects to be traced from their initial co-ordination stages, where the increase 
of mutual security and reduction of transaction costs prevails, to a point of increasingly 
dense networks, institutions, and organisations that reflect tighter co-ordination and co-
operation. This also implies sharing common identity traits and, subsequently, the enter-
tainment of dependable expectations of peaceful change. 
The extent of this particular framework, however, warranted caution over its wide-
spread application. Hurrell, for instance, pointed out that, only when ‘cooperation goes 
beyond instrumental calculation’ and ‘the use of force declines’ is it possible to consider 
the validity of the security community concept in its constructivist reinterpretation (1998: 
229–30). Moreover, the recurrent requirement of ‘a liberal-democratic milieu featuring 
significant economic interdependence and political pluralism’ proved an additional ob-
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stacle (Acharya 1998: 198). Hence, identification of security communities other than the 
one structured around the North Atlantic remained difficult to achieve.1
Seeking to deepen the subject, Buzan and Wæver advanced their own concept of re-
gional security complexes.2 Building upon the work carried out under the security com-
munity’s aegis, regional security complexes thus comprised a ‘set of units whose major 
processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security 
problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan and 
Wæver 2003: 44). In other words, such structures were based on dense regions, where 
security dilemmas can become sharper among proximate actors with shared histories of 
interaction. Over time, patterns of amity and enmity could arise from these regular trans-
actions, including flows of threats or friendship (Kelly 2007: 206–207).
However, their focus on how geographic density generates interdependence and how 
security interaction is assumed to be more intense in a locally concentrated area also posed 
a problem. In other words, it was unclear if participation would be restricted to specific 
geographical lines or if there were linkages with outside actors. In a revised version of their 
work, Buzan and Wæver warned against an expanded reach of the concept, given ‘that 
most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones’ (2003: 11–12). 
Subsequent adjustments were proposed in which regional security complexes should be 
understood as a set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that 
emanate from a distinct geographic area. This way, limitations over geographic boundar-
ies would be overcome (Morgan 1997: 30). This understanding, however, also warranted 
criticism for the risk of losing the regional trait per se. Following this rationale to the let-
ter, any great power would be a part of nearly every regional complex in the world, thus 
transcending the originally intended analysis of sub-systemic dynamics.
A third and more recent attempt to address regional security relations concerns the 
concept of regional security governance, which views the problematics of international 
relations as defined by the supply of order and the regulation of conflict without resort-
ing to war (Sperling 2014: 105). Its ultimate purpose is to provide an overarching concept 
that allows for the dilution of previous frameworks and a more streamlined analysis of 
regional dynamics. In general terms, the focus is attributed to holistic regional security 
architectures that foresee formal and informal interactions, via discourse, norms, shared 
understandings, rules, and practices (Kirchner 2007). Regional security governance is 
thus brought up whenever possible shared definitions of security issues arise, which can, 
in turn, be managed and resolved in collaboration beyond the mere national level.
Taken together, these three contributions hold an uncontested centrality amidst at-
tempts to apprehend security-based regional integration dynamics. And even though they 
do not comprise entirely autonomous theoretical frameworks on their own, they can still 
assist in informing the analysis of such phenomena while structuring the different embed-
ded features. Given the lack of definitive consensus, one trend in regional security studies 
seems to reside in combining multiple different concepts, often with mixed results (Serbin 
and Serbin Pont 2016: 132). Such exercises, however, can prove as frustrating as futile, 
given that potential comparisons with similar processes in different parts of the world 
remain invariably lacking. A more analytical approach is therefore required in order to 
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ascertain how such dynamics ensue in the present world order. In the upcoming section, 
I propose taking a step back in this debate and breaking down the components of the 
process in question.
Unpacking security regionalism
The South Atlantic consists of a curious case to unpack the elements of an alleged security 
regionalism drive. Even though countries in this area have often claimed to be working 
towards bringing the two continental shores together, they nevertheless failed to devise 
or sustain transoceanic initiatives over time with any meaningful impact. The goal of an 
exclusive regional security agenda behind the creation of the Zone of Peace and Co-op-
eration in the South Atlantic (ZOPACAS) in 1986 proved short-lived, as the forum faded 
into institutional hibernation in the following decade. Meanwhile, bilateral security-led 
co-operative initiatives survived, but remained largely incipient (e.g. Khanyile 2003), that 
is, until new overtures after the turn of the century began to take place under Brazilian 
leadership, while infusing them with a new kind of regional discourse (Abdenur and Sou-
za Neto 2014; Duarte 2016). This revamped collective drive became evident as statements 
by both South African and Brazilian officials exemplify:
We are fortunate to have our brotherly countries from South Amer-
ica, which have co-joined through the waters of the South Atlantic 
in our quest to seek a better life for all. […] Our peoples cannot but 
expect our best efforts in ensuring that this region is free of weapons 
of mass destruction, narcotics and illegal small arms and weapons 
(Pahad 2007).
Let us be ambitious. We have our own identity as a region, we are 
aware of it, and we are proud of it. But that is not enough. It is re-
quired that such identity, which is ours, has visibility before the en-
tire world (Patriota 2013, author’s translation).
Discourse aside, a series of benchmarks is still required in order to unpack these rela-
tions and ascertain their potential towards driving a wider South Atlantic security region-
alism process based on key co-operation endeavours. Accordingly, I resort to a framework 
first proposed by Acharya, who previously deemed military-security co-operation as one 
of the ‘least pronounced and effective aspects of regionalism among Third World coun-
tries’ (1992: 7). Even though the end of the Cold War spelt out fundamental changes to 
this rationale, its basic tenets remain valid. Bearing in mind this input, four updated cri-
teria can be presented. 
The first concerns the issue of intra-regional conflict. Unless previous or latent con-
flicts within a selected group of countries are resolved or subsided, it is hard to envi-
sion any kind of effective security regionalism thriving under such precarious geopolitical 
conditions. More so when accounting for how ‘regional turmoil’ might bring down any 
hopes of meaningful region formation and instead become a ‘pull factor for foreign pow-
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ers’ to intervene in the area (Battaglino 2012: 92). Instead of fomenting further intra co-
operation, such pending tensions would then in fact work against this. A regional security 
agenda, loosely conceptualised as it may be, is therefore necessarily contingent on a mini-
mal clean slate within its borders in tandem with a sizeable level of political co-ordination 
aimed at tackling any unresolved issues that might still linger on.
Secondly, how this co-operation is structured and how it can be successfully opera-
tionalised is also key. This can be examined on two distinct sub-levels. The first involves 
the development and consolidation of formal venues for co-operation that ensures its 
continuity beyond political-economic cycles. The track record of global South countries 
in this regard has been noteworthy, with the creation of several overlapping regional se-
curity-driven mechanisms over the years (e.g. Weiffen et al. 2013), sometimes even with 
different overall geographic mandates. But they have also displayed a strong inter-gov-
ernmental penchant coupled with weak institutional footing, thus warranting legitimate 
concerns over their operative role on a medium- and long-term basis. A second sub-level 
concerns how resources, different levels of military capability, and high-politics interests 
may hamper or foment the formalisation of co-operation relations. Whether or not the 
content of these dimensions materialises, it can hold back or incite wider regional security 
ambitions.
Thirdly, it is important to consider the different security agendas that such countries 
adhere to. The core of any co-operative push needs to address intrastate threats to regional 
actors inasmuch as external perils. This, in turn, can be based upon multiple threat percep-
tions as ‘anticipations of the future’ in terms of the ‘expectations aroused in the observer 
by the perceived infringement’ (Cohen 1978: 101). Whether effectively demonstrated or 
merely hypothetically raised, publically vented appreciations and assumptions of security 
threats comprise useful indicators of the awareness of regional security problems. Yet, un-
less shared or given equal priority across time and space, they will invariably fall short of 
promoting greater collective developments.
And lastly, autonomy, or lack thereof, of this kind of co-operation flows before the 
surrounding international system also ought to be evaluated. Even though external pow-
ers have been generally recognised as important exogenous factors for the development of 
regionalism (Börzel 2016: 44–5), they can also become possible roadblocks to its imple-
mentation. This is particularly so if they serve as alternative security providers that may 
hold interests of their own in the security and stability of the overall area and thus affect 
the viability of regionally endogenous solutions. For instance, when analysing the emer-
gence of the South American Defence Council (SADC), Battaglino notes that it was not 
‘simply the result of US disinterest’ in the region but that this new structure also ended 
up representing a ‘reaccommodation of political, economic, military and ideological re-
sources in the management of sovereign decisions in the South’ (2012: 98). The reverse 
situation can be found with regards to Southeast Asia, where the range of regional defence 
initiatives have been neutralised by the continuing reliance on the security guaranties of 
external powers (Tan 2012: 240). The full extent of such outer connections should thus be 
taken into account when ascertaining the emergence of new regional security endeavours.
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Overall, these four criteria – absence of intra-regional conflict, the existence of for-
mal venues and tangible co-operation exchanges, shared security agendas, and autonomy 
from external powers – can assist in verifying allegations that new regionalisms are pres-
ently in the making, while structured around security-driven assumptions. 
Testing the limits: South Atlantic security regionalism
This section breaks down claims of an incremental construction of a South Atlantic re-
gionalism process, while structured on bilateral, multilateral, and transnational co-oper-
ation initiatives and on increased exchanges of defence capabilities and know-how across 
the ocean. Such vectors of engagement towards the South Atlantic have been presented 
as aiming to instil the notion of a common regional project. Their full content, execu-
tion, and overall subscription by the vying partners, however, requires a more fine-tuned 
analysis while bearing in mind the four criteria previously mentioned. Despite remaining 
an area still in need of precise delimitation, this exercise attends to the broader geographic 
limits of the area as the most adequate representation of the dynamics at play.
Intra-regional conflict
At first glance, the South Atlantic presents itself as an area visibly free of intra-state con-
flicts in contrast with other regions of the world. Indeed, no particularly major transat-
lantic conflict or tensions can be found between local state actors. Past regional conflicts, 
such as Angola’s involvement in the DRC, have nearly subsided. And even when the ap-
plication of international legal mandates proves contentious, issues are often dealt with 
by the book. The detention of Argentinean frigate Libertad by Ghanaian authorities in 
2012, for instance, was ultimately reversed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) and respected by all parties involved. This helps to fuel a political discourse 
that South Atlantic countries abide by the ‘principles of International Law, including the 
principles of sovereignty and sovereign equality of states, territorial integrity, settlement 
of international disputes by peaceful means, and non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of state’ (UNGA 2013). 
Such claims find additional corroboration in the declining tokens of armed conflict 
in the area. That applies more clearly to the South American shores of the Atlantic.3 But 
it also suits the African side, where militarised disputes have strikingly decreased in re-
cent years.4 As exhibited in Figure 1, from the total 37 incidents recorded between 1990 
and 2010 that involved at least two South Atlantic countries, 25 were initiated during the 
1990s.5 The later years of the following decade display a visible decrease in registered oc-
currences.
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Figure 1 – Militarised interstate disputes in the South Atlantic (1990–2010)
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Source: The Correlates of War Project database / compiled by the author
However, despite the validity of such indicators, these results also warrant a measure 
of caution, as they tend to hide underlined caveats, namely, in the form of unresolved 
border disputes and tensions that often comprise sources of potential conflict, particu-
larly on African shores. Moreover, areas that lie at the forefront of such disputes also tend 
to harbour military skirmishes, terrorism, smuggling, ethnic violence, people trafficking, 
or drug trafficking, thus contributing to overall state and regional instability (Oduntan 
2015). Hence, the disruptive potential of these disputes, eventually minimised by the in-
volvement of international legal mechanisms as they may be, cannot be entirely under-
stated and can, in turn, fuel additional regional tensions.
West Africa, in particular, proves a sound example. Recent border disputes have in-
cluded, for instance, disagreements between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over the 
mouth of the Ntem River, despite a ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
2002. The same dispositions apply to the Bakassi peninsula, strategically located in the 
Gulf of Guinea in between Cameroon and Nigeria. Meanwhile, the dispute over the Ga-
bon-occupied Mbane islands, as well as the maritime boundary of the oil-rich Corisco 
Bay, continues to pit Equatorial Guinea against Gabon while the settling of a maritime 
border between Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana awaits a final decision by ITLOS. In Southern 
Africa, similar contending claims can be found, particularly over river-basin areas. Na-
mibia and South Africa, for example, continue to disagree over their final borders along 
the Orange River inasmuch as the Congo River presents itself a challenge to establishing a 
final border delimitation between the Republic of Congo and the DRC. 
Widespread findings of large hydrocarbon deposits in the pre-salt layers of both At-
lantic margins in the last decade, together with previously existing untapped reserves, 
have also elevated the risk associated with undefined maritime limits. The DRC, for in-
stance, is involved in a long-standing dispute with Angola over their maritime boundary. 
In fact, the former’s submission in 2013 for the extension of its continental shelf under the 
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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) triggered renewed opposi-
tion by the DRC and Gabon, who both argue that it oversteps the area of their own claims. 
Among several possible headways, legal disputes over the sovereignty of these areas are 
likely to increase in the coming years, while heralding unpredictable outcomes, and more 
so given the present South Atlantic context where countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Cape Verde, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Uruguay have also already submitted claims in their own 
right in recent years.6 Although not impeditive to any joint co-operative venture ad initio, 
these formal procedures herald potential diverging views over the control and exploration 
of similarly coveted areas and can heighten the risk of new disputes.
Structure
Determining how to effectively structure embryonic co-operation relations is key for their 
endurance over time. This requirement can be best analysed on two separate but interre-
lated fronts, namely the current state of formal venues that may underpin such co-opera-
tion flows, and the actual content of such relations in terms of meaningful and sustainable 
inroads that address common South Atlantic security needs.
Venues
Previous attempts to map the institutional web of potential multilateral security providers 
in the South Atlantic have confirmed its complex and intertwined nature, often without 
concrete results to show (Abdenur 2014). That can chiefly be attributed to each organisa-
tion’s inner workings, whose security dispositions can be either nearly non-existent in 
terms of the wider maritime domain (e.g. UNASUR) or mostly confined to their own 
limited shorelines (e.g. ECOWAS, SADC). The most recent attempt to promote tangible 
intersections only happened upon UN request, when the Economic Community for West 
African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC) gathered in Yaoundé, Cameroon, in July 2013 
to try to tackle the issue of rising piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea. But despite these 
brewing intra-institutional dialogues, there are still scarce overarching mechanisms with a 
transatlantic scope that effectively cut across the South Atlantic area and strive to establish 
regular venues of communications between both margins, much less so in the regional 
security domain. 
An unlikely, if exploratory, case could be made in terms of the wider format of the 
Africa and South America (ASA) Heads of State and Government summits. Despite a 
far-ranging agenda focused on multiple sectorial co-operation initiatives, every different 
meeting (Abuja in 2006, Nueva Esparta in 2009, and Malabo in 2013) has managed to 
include political-security considerations among the items up for discussion, while em-
phasising the adoption of ‘measures to encourage confidence and co-operation in the 
fields of defence and security, as the best means to warrant stability, security, democracy, 
human rights and comprehensive development’ (ASA 2009: 19).7 Towards that end, the 
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implementation plan for 2013–2016 foresaw closer contacts and consultations on secu-
rity matters of mutual interest, including with third-party institutions such as the African 
Union Peace and Security Council or the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, as 
well as joint initiatives to exchange information and experiences (ASA 2013a). Under the 
framework of the Peace and Security Working Group, jointly chaired by Argentina and 
Libya, a workshop over South–South Co-operation on arms control and dual use technol-
ogies was even organised in June 2013 in Buenos Aires, which focused on such issues as: 
small and light weapons; management of security forces arsenals; international transfers 
of arms; national systems on sensitive exports control; national control mechanisms on 
chemical substances; nuclear materials security; and schemes of co-operation on training 
for the detection of illicit traffic (ASA 2013b). Its overall implementation, however, has 
remained largely incipient and contingent on the fluctuations of national interest in both 
South America and Africa for the ASA format in itself. Its wide bi-continental focus, on 
the other hand, also raises legitimate questions over any effective Atlantic-tailored agenda.
The bulk of recent claims over a South Atlantic region in the making have clearly 
resided in the ongoing attempts to revitalise ZOPACAS. Still, in order to achieve this goal, 
tokens of proven leadership by a pivot country were invariably required. And much like 
other integration projects in which it has been involved before, Brazil was faced with a 
dual expectation and choice of whether or not to assume its condition of regional paymas-
ter. In that sense, after initial exploratory inroads during the Luanda Ministering Meet-
ing of 2007, Brazil began to exhibit a more evident predisposition towards the pickup of 
ZOPACAS during the subsequent ministerial meeting in Montevideo in 2013, with the 
aim of adding substance to the transatlantic agenda. That ranged from offers of support 
over the delimitation of African continental shelves to the exchange of operational experi-
ence on peacekeeping and maritime surveillance, and even to the training of specialised 
human resources.8 
The common thread to these proposals was straightforward: to increase the consciousness 
of a common South Atlantic, ideally structured around defence-related initiatives. By attempt-
ing to substantiate the revitalisation of ZOPACAS, Brazil sought to tie it to the disbursement 
of new defence co-operation initiatives that could simultaneously incite greater regional cohe-
siveness and consolidate its status in the area. Or, to put it differently, ZOPACAS remained a 
useful venue in the direct proportion of Brazil’s willingness and capabilities to both sustain and 
promote it. Once the country’s economic crisis began to take its toll in 2015, however, the will-
ingness and capabilities made available plummeted. The lack of any kind of permanent struc-
ture that would allow a more regular workload and ensure a steady flow of interactions further 
brought such structural dependence into light (Abdenur et al. 2016). The indefinite postpone-
ment of the following ministerial meeting scheduled to have taken place in Cape Verde in 2015 
further attests to this bleak assessment.
Content
When taking stock of South Atlantic co-operation in the security and defence domains, 
two features stand out. On the one hand, the significance of bilateral efforts that, despite 
Stretching the Limits? Strengths and Pitfalls of South Atlantic Security Regionalism   vol. 39(2) May/Aug 2017 315
varying degrees of longevity and success, are often presented as tokens of what could be 
achieved if a long-term ideal regional scenario is envisioned. On the other hand, the mul-
tiplication of international military exercises, which have endured as near-collective en-
deavours with the purpose of fostering interoperability and common practices between 
different security sectors on a semi-regular basis.
Bilateral forays have helped to sustain South Atlantic rhetoric over the years. The ex-
tensive network of defence attachés established by both Brazil and South Africa, for in-
stance, provided important communication channels for official contacts.9 But concrete 
operational missions are also noteworthy. The Brazilian engagement with Namibia is 
paradigmatic in that regard. Present on the ground since 1994, the Brazilian Navy took 
charge of building up its Namibian counterpart through a combination of training oppor-
tunities, sale of military hardware, and provision of maritime scientific know-how, while 
remaining a key partner until today (Seabra 2016). This successful experience then led to 
recent attempts to replicate the same model in Cape Verde, through the establishment of 
the Brazilian Naval Mission in August 2013, in charge of assessing local needs. Soon after-
wards, the same kind of bilateral engagement was sought out with São Tomé and Principe. 
Accordingly, in November 2014, the Brazilian Navy Chief of Staff authorised the creation 
of an embryonic structure on the ground, with the intent of opening a full naval mis-
sion in 2015. Meanwhile, the numbers of training slots in Brazilian military institutions 
for African military personnel visibly increased during the same period (Seabra 2014: 
89–91). That same approach has been adopted by such African countries as Nigeria with 
regard to its own regional neighbours (Ali 2012), as well as by South Africa through the 
so-called Mission Thebe in the DRC (Vines 2010), in terms of multiple military training 
opportunities.
Other bilateral initiatives, however, proved less successful. The attempt to install the 
Missão Brasileira de Cooperação Técnico-Militar (MBCTM – Brazilian Mission for Techni-
cal-Military Co-operation) in Guinea-Bissau constituted Brazil’s first serious Security Sec-
tor Reform (SSR) foray in Africa. However, frequent disruptions of internal order brought 
this project to a standstill. Likewise, the same could be said of Angola’s failed attempt to 
provide military expertise and capabilities to Guinea-Bissau in 2011. In a rare out-of-
area engagement for a post-civil war nation, the Missão Militar Angolana na Guiné-Bissau 
(MISSANG – Angolan Military Mission in Guinea-Bissau), composed of over 200 mili-
tary and policemen, failed to contribute to the resolution of the recurring local political-
military crises.
But despite these efforts towards providing expertise and capabilities beyond each 
country’s sphere of interests, joint military exercises and naval manoeuvres have remained 
the most constant variable. An enduring example can be found in terms of the ATLASUR 
naval exercises, which started in 1993 between Argentina and South Africa, with Brazil 
and Uruguay joining two years later. With ten editions under its belt, it remains the single 
prevailing token of military-to-military exchanges within the region. In search of new op-
portunities, in October 2012, a symposium on ‘Co-operation between Navies on Security 
and Situational Awareness in the South Atlantic’ was also organised in Rio de Janeiro, 
with the participation of Angolan, Brazilian, Namibian, and South African officers. The 
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intended goals included increased interoperability between the attending navies and the 
expansion of co-operation in terms of maritime security and naval operations in the South 
Atlantic.
The most visible outcome of these discussions consisted in triggering preparations for 
the exercise code-named ATLANTIC TIDINGS. Initially heralded as the exercise which 
would for the first time bring together the navies of such countries as Angola, Brazil, the 
DRC, Namibia, and South Africa along the African coastline, it has, however, been mostly 
characterised by its stillborn nature. Indeed, despite being scheduled for September 2013, 
it was eventually ‘cancelled by the lead nation, Angola, due to capacity challenges’ (De-
partment of Defence of South Africa 2014: 80). It has since then been repeatedly post-
poned, after losing the active participation of the DRC in the meantime.
 Two inter-regional endeavours are also worthy of mention due to their evident link-
ages with the South Atlantic area. On the one hand, the FELINO exercises, organised 
under the framework of the Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (CPLP – Com-
munity of Portuguese Speaking Countries). Since their inception in 2000, seven editions 
(2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2010, 2013) have taken place on South Atlantic coasts be-
tween Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Principe.10 On the other hand, the 
IBSAMAR exercise between the navies of Brazil, India, and South Africa has also retained 
a continuing Atlantic focus. Of the total five editions, the first four (2008, 2010, 2012, 
2014) occurred in either Brazilian or South African waters. But despite their inherent 
contribution to developing regional capabilities and maritime awareness, calls for greater 
interregional synergies remain doubtful to emerge (Vaz 2015). And much like activities 
carried out within the ASA framework, these events lack a specific South Atlantic drive, 
hence contributing to any regionalism drive more by association than by deliberate design.
Agenda
In order to succeed in its implementation, a regional security agenda needs to be adjusted 
to the most pressing needs that its constitutive parts face on the ground. Hence, it needs 
to target both conventional and non-conventional threats that may affect the area in ques-
tion, while also juggling the main national priorities and calling for the necessary means 
required for any kind of joint response.
In this context, the bulk of security threats in the South Atlantic have not veered away 
from what can be found in other international maritime areas, as they assume a clear 
non-state and non-conventional nature. The issue of piracy, in particular, often associated 
with other organised criminal activities, began to garner a new focus as it became more 
violent and organised in the Gulf of Guinea. Countries like Nigeria, Benin, and Togo have 
comprised the main targets, as pirates take advantage of poor maritime surveillance and 
still-incipient regional cooperation.11 This, in turn, increases the risks over major trade 
and communications lanes in the area. Transatlantic drug trafficking flows, on the other 
hand, continue to figure high on the agenda. Due to such local weaknesses as deficient 
controls at ports and poor inspection equipment, South American drug cartels have tar-
geted Atlantic waters as preferable transit routes for European markets. Invariably, it is 
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hard to deny that ‘linguistic ties … play a role in cocaine trafficking from South America 
to Europe via Brazil, Portugal, and Lusophone countries in Africa’ (UNDOC 2013: 43). 
But while reflecting a growing trend of escalation of the security risks in Atlantic waters 
and nearby African shores, issues such as piracy or drug trafficking also evidence linkages 
to structural fragilities present in the security apparatuses of many African countries.
However, despite their visibility and increased magnitude, these threats have come to 
warrant different degrees of awareness. A sample of four South Atlantic countries, namely 
Brazil, Cape Verde, South Africa and Uruguay, is taken here as representative of the un-
derlined defence sensibilities and perceptions towards the same overall maritime space, 
and used as a potential indicator in that regard.12 This particular selection provides a bal-
ance between regional powers and small states on both shores, with different sets of for-
eign policy ambitions and material capabilities.
Table 1 – Defence outlooks towards the South Atlantic (Brazil, Cape Verde, South Africa and Uruguay)
Brazil Cape Verde South Africa Uruguay
Piracy Unmentioned Threat to economic 
development
Equalled to trans-
-national and trans-
-oceanic threats
Unmentioned
Drug trafficking 
and organised 
crime
Unmentioned Equalled to an 
external and internal 
threat
Possible regional 
hub and transit zone 
for illicit drugs
Unmentioned
Communications 
and trade lanes
Obligation to ensure 
the security of ma-
ritime communica-
tion and navigation 
lanes
Obligation to ensure 
the security of navi-
gation routes that go 
through the national 
maritime space
Obligation to uphold 
freedom of seas and 
protect the country’s 
economy
Obligation to 
ensure the 
surveillance and 
control of juris-
dictional waters 
and maritime 
communication 
lanes
Other threats
Possibility of 
attacks on oil 
platforms and naval 
installations; war in 
the South Atlantic
Non-proliferation; 
terrorism; territorial 
aggression; natural 
disasters
Terrorism; non-pro-
liferation; private 
security companies; 
natural disasters; 
poverty; migra-
tion; food security; 
pandemics
Possibility of 
extra-regional 
conflict in Mal-
vinas
Source: Systematised by the author
As evidenced in Table 1, some divergence can be found between the national percep-
tions of the four selected countries when regarding their security and defence priorities to-
wards their maritime domains and, inherently, the overall South Atlantic. In fact, the admis-
sion of a possible full-blown war in the area helps to clearly contrast South American and 
African positions, as the legacy of the Malvinas War is evidently perceived in different mea-
sure. Yet despite such individual disparities, a case could still be made that such a compari-
son is structured on faulty grounds, given that it depends on official orientations that may 
not sufficiently accompany regional trends or escalating threats. Guinea-Bissau, for instance, 
comprises a recurrent regional hotspot due to its exposure to drug trafficking routes. And 
despite lacking formal consecration in Brazilian guidelines, the local context still continues 
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to prove worrisome nonetheless, as a former Brazilian Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau made 
clear during his confirmation hearing:
The thing that is more worrying, not only for the US, who have al-
ready stated it, but also for the EU, which in the end is the final con-
sumer, is also the thing that worries Brazil. Why? Of all the drugs 
that go through the Gulf of Guinea, in the case of Guinea-Bissau, 
60% come from Brazil. Not that they are produced in Brazil, but they 
circulate through Brazil and from here go there. […] So, one way or 
the other, Brazil is involved in this (Federal Senate of Brazil 2007, 
author’s translation).
An alternative source of regional awareness should then be considered. Different mul-
tilateral mechanisms in the South Atlantic have come to profess a more cohesive line in 
terms of the perils that the area faces. The multiple official documents, guidelines, and 
strategies issued in recent years all point to a similar priority on key security issues. For 
example, the 2011 SADC Maritime Strategy, the 2013 Gulf Commission Maritime Strat-
egy, the 2013 Code of Conduct for the Gulf of Guinea, and the 2014 ECOWAS Integrated 
Maritime Strategy – which, together, comprise the canon of African regional orientations 
towards the Atlantic – subscribe to the same level of priority in dealing with issues of pi-
racy, armed robbery, and illicit maritime activities and have therefore contributed to step 
up co-ordinated efforts in tackling this kind of threat.
On a more transatlantic note, the final declarations and action plans of both ZOPA-
CAS and ASA Summits also raise the same kind of regional insight that is required in 
order to incite greater regional responses. Whether stressing ‘the need to continue to pre-
serve the South Atlantic region free from the scourge of war, the instability of conflict, 
drug trafficking, piracy’ (UNGA 2013) or reaffirming a ‘strong commitment to fight ter-
rorism, piracy, drug trafficking and other forms of organised crimes, including payment of 
ransom to terrorist groups and international organised crime’ (ASA 2013b), it is possible 
to find increased levels of concertation at a multilateral level. In the case of ZOPACAS, the 
2013 meeting even included parallel declarations over the situation in Malvinas, Guinea 
Bissau, and the DRC as additional tokens of commitment by South Atlantic countries to 
deal with conflict resolution situations within their own area. Hence, and even though na-
tional perceptions might not entirely match, that can be considered as compensated for by 
an increasing summitry discourse, more flexible and more in tune with current develop-
ments, while also more capable of showcasing common regional stances towards security 
issues in the surrounding maritime area.
Autonomy 
Picturing the South Atlantic without the physical and ideational presence of outside pow-
ers is a virtually impossible exercise. The historical track record is rich in developments 
that have both defined and characterised regional dynamics, including on a security and 
Stretching the Limits? Strengths and Pitfalls of South Atlantic Security Regionalism   vol. 39(2) May/Aug 2017 319
defence level. On that note, the specific legacy of the Malvinas War continues to linger on 
over the regional agenda, with both the UK and Argentina unable to settle their territorial 
dispute while often engaging in a routine of public acrimony. New layers of complexity 
were added after the issue of sovereignty over the surrounding seabed area and associated 
mineral resources began to take centre stage (Dodds 2016). Moreover, this issue casts 
a wider spotlight on the remaining overseas maritime territories within South Atlantic 
limits controlled by outside powers: South Georgia, South Sandwich, Ascension, Saint 
Helena, and Tristan da Cunha, which can be deemed as geographic roadblocks in the way 
of wider regional cohesion. 
But perceptions of external presence and interference in the South Atlantic are also 
further heightened when accounting for the military footprint that is found in this area. 
The use of Ascension’s military facilities, together with several unofficial Forward Opera-
tions Locations (FOLs) spread throughout the African continent, have proven a recurrent 
linchpin of the USA’s southwards policy. Likewise, French military bases in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gabon, and Senegal, as well as the UK-led International Military Advisory and Training 
Team (IMATT), stationed in Sierra Leone since 2002, continue to house rapid-deploy-
ment forces until this day for whenever security hotspots escalate, all the while benefiting 
from preferential post-colonial security arrangements. 
Similar tokens of out-of-area engagement derive from existing military exercises. In 
fact, the longest standing military exercise in the South Atlantic also comprises the longest 
serving example of the USA’s reach in this area. The United International Anti-Submarine 
warfare training (UNITAS) started in 1960 with the purpose of providing Argentinean, 
Brazilian, and Uruguayan navies with opportunities to jointly train with their North 
American counterpart. Even though it was set up as a complement to the Coordenação 
Marítima do Atlântico Sul (CAMAS – South Atlantic Maritime Area Command) frame-
work, itself a product of the Inter-American Defence Board (Hurrell 1983: 189), UNITAS 
survived the changing international context and continues to take place on a regular basis. 
More recently, news of the reactivation of the US 4th Fleet in 2008 spurred official uproar 
over the perceived intent to counteract the emergence of new Southern regional powers 
in their envisioned area of operations. Taken together with the USA’s continuing non-
ratification of UNCLOS, the announcement was used to raise awareness over the need for 
region-tailored approaches towards maritime areas that did not include outside countries 
(e.g. Battaglino 2009).
These episodes, however, pale in comparison to developments in the Gulf of Guinea, 
where external interests and initiatives have multiplied, often in an intertwined fashion. 
The case of the OBANGAME EXPRESS stands out. Created and led by the US Navy under 
the African Partnership Station (APS) framework, it has quickly secured the mantle of the 
single largest multinational exercise in West African waters, with the number of partici-
pating nations going from nine in the inaugural 2011 edition to thirty-three in 2016. On 
the other hand, the Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea (CRIMGO) program, 
funded and co-ordinated by the European Commission, is presented as a model tool in 
providing capacity-building expertise to regional countries, through outside support.
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Finally, another clear contrast between regional and outside powers can also be drawn 
up in terms of the formalisation of co-operation initiatives. South American countries, in 
particular, proved considerably active in recent years. Between 2003 and 2015, Brazilian 
authorities pushed for the signing of eight new defence co-operation agreements with 
African countries in the South Atlantic, in a bid to devise a common framework for their 
defence co-operation initiatives (Seabra 2014: 87). That included Angola, Guinea-Bissau, 
Equatorial Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, and South Africa. 
On the other hand, Argentina further advanced relations with South Africa through an 
overall defence co-operation agreement in 2010.
 But those efforts have failed to reach the magnitude of the networks previously estab-
lished, and later reinforced, by external powers. France, for example, currently holds a to-
tal of 16 different co-operation agreements in place. Yet, only one country ever succeeded 
in implementing formal defence relations with every single country in the South Atlantic, 
namely the USA. Since 1949, a total of 113 formal agreements have been signed with 
regard to such matters as, for example, the International Military Education and Train-
ing Program (IMET) or the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMS).13 At a first glance, it 
would be easy to attribute such impetus to Cold War predicaments. However, as exhibited 
in Figure 2, the bulk of these formalities actually originated after the end of the Cold 
War, thus demonstrating a sustained interest afterwards in security-related developments 
within this area.
Figure 2 – Defence agreements between the USA and France with South Atlantic countries 
(1948–2014)
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Although hardly definitive in itself, this push to formalise security-driven relations 
with countries in the area may offer tentative grounds to those who attribute a role to 
the USA as a South Atlantic defence pivot or, at the very least, the more effective one in 
inciting a common security awareness. Even though autonomy does not equal exclusivity, 
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the unparalleled capacities of external powers, coupled with their continuous presence 
on both Atlantic shores through multiple material means, does highlight a measure of 
dependence on the security guarantees provide by outer-region actors. It therefore makes 
it difficult for any security regionalism drive to be implemented and thrive on its own.
Conclusion
The significance of regions in the international system has proved a contentious issue in 
light of the push of globalisation. But the claim that ‘globalization is encouraging a region-
al pushback’ has also proved appealing in recent decades, with interest in new regionalist 
takes spiking in equal measure (Kelly 2007: 197; e.g. Mattheis 2014). In this context, se-
curity regionalism has not remained immutable. Still, and despite different contributions 
over the years, no existing proposal has yet been able to fully grasp evolving dynamics 
that aspire to form a new regionalism process structured around security-driven issues. 
Recent literature trends appear to favour a regional governance conceptualisation over 
previous one-size-fits-all solutions like the security communities’ framework or overly 
flexible models like regional security complexes (Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan 2016). 
But, as this article demonstrates, a focus on specific modalities of regional co-operation 
that may incite and drive a wider regionalisation process might just herald equally sat-
isfactory results in unpacking potential regions in the making. This does not mean that 
the criteria adopted can fit or encapsulate every series of similar dynamics in the world 
at large. The issue of how to apprehend the role of external powers in either inciting or 
blocking this kind of development in the security domain, for instance, will always vary 
from case to case, depending on the historical track record and previously existing en-
gagements. But the criteria’s general utility remains in terms of uncovering the strengths 
and pitfalls of any official discourse that attempts to construct a regional project based on 
a top-down approach.
However, this also raises a second batch of problems by highlighting the inherent lim-
its of any overtly regional initiative nowadays. Latin American regionalism, for example, 
is considered to have ‘reached a peak beyond which it will be unable to progress. Yet, the 
exhaustion of comprehensive integration projects does not mean that regional coopera-
tion will not take place,’ but rather that the ‘pooling or delegation of sovereignty will no 
longer be an option’ (Malamud and Gardini 2012: 125). These same conclusions could be 
transplanted to the South Atlantic case, where regional co-operation is likely to continue 
in some measure but unlikely to evolve into any kind of more meaningful regional inte-
gration. 
This downsizing of expectations over the build-up of a new regional drive in the 
South Atlantic can be inferred from the analysis of the ongoing endeavours targeted by 
this article, following the proposed criteria. To be sure, significant ties in the security and 
defence domain have indeed emerged over the years between both shores at the same time 
as intra-state conflict have markedly declined within the area. Even though this peaceful 
evolution may abide more with a wider global trend rather than a strictly regional one, it 
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has positively influenced regional developments nonetheless. Moreover, previous existing 
defence co-operation initiatives have been used as springboards for greater interactions 
while military exercises have multiplied in number and substance. These factors alone are 
significant enough to increase the odds of effectiveness behind a new regional discourse, 
in stark contrast to previous attempts made during the Cold War.
Yet, wider regional achievements have also been chronically dampened by a pattern of 
irregularity in the workload of multilateral gatherings and a clear preference for declara-
tory commitments instead of formal obligations. That invariably makes claims of a South 
Atlantic security regionalism stand out as extremely diffuse in its goals and occasionally 
hollow in its accomplishments. Simultaneously, this has led to far more concrete develop-
ments on the African side of the South Atlantic, exclusively focused on pressing African is-
sues rather than on transatlantic opportunities per se. This ‘tyranny of geography’ inherent 
to the vastness of the oceanic space in between also contributes to the maintenance and 
expansion of security ties with outer-region actors. With no evident regional paymaster 
or pivot leader in sight and with Brazil on a reverse course from the previously exhibited 
South Atlantic impetus between 2003 and 2014, outside competition and alternatives to 
strictly regional endeavours are bound to remain valid options and undercut the purpose 
of more autonomous solutions.
Hence, and much like what can be observed with other similar case studies in South-
east Asia, it is possible to argue that the South Atlantic still ‘lacks the strategic imperative 
and institutional coherence befitting a model of regionalism’ (Tan 2012: 231). In other 
words, South Atlantic security regionalism lacks a stable and permanent structure inas-
much as it lacks real autonomy from the dictums of external powers to the area. Shared 
threat perceptions can only do so much as aggregating regional leitmotivs, and the current 
absence of major intra-regional conflicts does not necessarily imply this option has been 
wholly discarded. 
While not definitive, this analysis has highlighted dynamics that clearly warrant fur-
ther observation. Specifically, more focus needs to be given to African perceptions of At-
lantic security issues, given that public debate on the topic has come to overwhelmingly 
adhere to Brazil’s lead in recent years. Likewise, the growing interest in South Atlantic 
security issues by extra-regional players such as China or the linkages between security 
endeavours and more ambivalent activities, like the provision of technical-scientific co-
operation, have also yet to be sufficiently explored and intersected. The same applies to 
how the private sector and, more particularly, national defence industry conglomerates 
in both margins have contributed to stoking official interest in these developments. How-
ever, a key question still remains: Can security and defence overtures ever instil a sustain-
able regionalisation process in the South Atlantic? The consequences of this state of affairs 
do not curtail any other leitmotivs (e.g. trade; energy) from bringing countries in this 
area together, inasmuch as it happened in other parts of the world. But it does signal that 
the limits of the South Atlantic will remain invariably stretched if they are to be based on 
security tenets alone, while seeking to promote a region of its own.
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Notes
1 The shortcomings of their framework were admitted by Adler and Barnett themselves when in their edited 
volume, ‘nearly all the contributors found that their case deviated in significant ways from the model.’ This 
led them to conclude that ‘the insufficiency of the [proposed] indicators does not jettison their utility per 
se but rather questions their validity’ (1998: 431, 434).
2 Also worthy of mention is the research carried over the issue of zones of peace and its ties to the necessity 
(or lack thereof) of a democratic regime to the ultimate development of a pluralistic security community 
(Kacowicz 1995).
3 That assessment changes, however, if we choose to adopt a wider Latin American perspective (Mares 2012).
4 Militarised interstate disputes are here defined as ‘united historical cases of conflict in which the threat, 
display or use of military force short of war by one member-state is explicitly directed towards the 
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state. Disputes are 
composed of incidents that range in intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war’ (Jones 
et al. 1996: 168).
5 Disputes involving external powers with territories in the South Atlantic are addressed in the Autonomy 
section.
6 Unlike the other countries, which have pursued individual claims, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Senegal, and Sierra Leone – together with Mauritania – submitted a joint submission in 2014 with 
regard to adjacent areas on their West African coasts.
7 The fourth summit was expected to have taken place in May 2016 in Ecuador but has since been postponed.
8 In November 2013, Brazil organised a training workshop on maritime search and rescue in Salvador. A 
second joint seminar on the planning, management, and execution of peacekeeping operations, also to be 
organised by Brazil, was expected to take place in 2014 but was subsequently postponed indefinitely.
9 By 2013, Brazil had defence attachés in Angola (with accreditation in São Tomé and Principe), Argentina, 
Cape Verde, Namibia, Nigeria (with accreditation in Ghana), Senegal (with accreditation in Benin and 
Togo), South Africa, and Uruguay. Likewise, negotiations began to include the DRC in this network. In 
return, Angola, Argentina, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uruguay maintain defence attachés 
stationed in Brasilia. On the other hand, by 2015 South Africa had resident defence attachés in Angola, 
Argentina, Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Namibia, and Nigeria, as well as non-resident representation in 
Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, and Uruguay. In return, Angola, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, 
the DRC, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Namibia, Nigeria, and Senegal maintain defence 
attachés stationed in Pretoria.
10 Within this institutional format, the second and third Symposiums of CPLP Navies also took place in 
Angola and Brazil in 2010 and 2012, respectively.
11 Records of both committed and attempted acts of piracy and armed robbery have stabilised in recent years: 
61 in 2011; 64 in 2012; 54 in 2013; and 41 in both 2014 and 2015. These attacks occurred in an area 
that included such countries as Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Sao Tome and Principe, and Togo (ICC International Maritime Bureau 2016: 5).
12 The comparison in Table 1 is based upon five key documents from the selected sample of South Atlantic 
countries: the 2012 updated versions of the Brazilian National Defence Strategy and the National Defence 
Policy; the 2011 Cape Verdean Strategic Concept for Defence and National Security; the 2014 South 
African Defence Strategic Review; and the 2014 Uruguayan National Defence Policy. Threat perceptions 
and priorities were extracted whenever explicitly tied to each country’s maritime interests.
13 The graphic depiction in Figure 2 includes every formal agreement labelled by the US State Department 
and the French Ministry of Foreign Relations as falling under the defence-military domain and currently 
still in force with countries from both sides of the South Atlantic. Despite not yet being mentioned in 
the US State Department’s official tally, the new agreement signed with Senegal in May 2016 was also 
accounted for.
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